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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN CASTRO, as an
individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,
vs.

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.,
a Delaware Corporation; UNITED
AIRLINES, INC, a Delaware
Corporation; and DOES 1 through
100, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:14-cv-00169-SVW-AGR

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; AND
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT**

Date: November 16, 2015
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Courtroom: 6
Judge: Stephen V. Wilson

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at 1:30 p.m., on November 16, 2015, or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard in Courtroom 6 of the United States District Court, Central District of California, Western Division, located at 312 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, before the Honorable Stephen V. Wilson, Plaintiff Zyra Garcia (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move this Court for an Order finally approving the proposed class action settlement. Specifically, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court issue an Order granting final approval of the proposed class action settlement.

Given that this is a Motion for Final Approval of a Settlement reached with Defendants Continental Airlines, Inc. and United Airlines, Inc. (“Defendants”), Plaintiff does not anticipate that Defendants will oppose this Motion.

This Motion is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, the accompanying Declarations of Larry W. Lee, Edward W. Choi, Thomas M. Lee and Zyra Garcia, any oral argument of counsel, the complete files and records in the above-captioned matter, and such additional matters as the Court may consider.

DATED: October 19, 2015

DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.

By: /S/LARRY W. LEE

Larry W. Lee, Esq.

Attorney for Plaintiff and the Class

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT

By this motion, Plaintiff Zyra Garcia (“Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of a substantial class-wide settlement reached between Plaintiff and Defendants Continental Airlines, Inc. and United Airlines, Inc. (“Defendants”) (Plaintiff and Defendants collectively, the “Parties”). On August 5, 2015, this Court granted preliminary approval of this class action settlement. (Doc. No. 60). The Parties now seek this Court’s final approval of the settlement.

The settlement requires Defendants to pay a total of \$3,250,000.00, a sum which represents a substantial recovery for the members of the Class. **Again, this settlement is non-reversionary, such that no monies will revert back to Defendants. Further, there is no claims process.** All class members who do not exclude themselves and/or have not opted-out will automatically be issued a settlement check. Moreover, all of this Court’s orders concerning dissemination of Notice of the Settlement have been scrupulously followed.

Furthermore, out of 3,770 Settlement Class Members, only 4 of those individuals have decided to opt-out, representing an exclusion rate of .1%. As such, this shows that the class members have reacted favorably to the settlement. Based thereon, Plaintiff respectfully requests that final approval be granted in its entirety.

II. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

After substantial litigation, discovery, and motion practice, including Plaintiff’s filing of a motion for class certification, the production and analysis of significant documents and payroll data, and after a full-day’s mediation with a highly regarded mediator and a subsequent mediator’s proposal, the Parties were able to arrive at the current settlement.

As briefed during the preliminary approval stage, the Parties have reached a class-wide resolution of the claims alleged in this action. At all times, Defendants disputed Plaintiff’s contentions, including that this case was suited for class

1 treatment and, more importantly, that Defendant would prevail on the merits. Had
 2 this case not settled, Defendant would have opposed Plaintiff's pending class
 3 certification motion and/or filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking
 4 dismissal of the claims asserted against Plaintiff and the entire class. However,
 5 despite such disagreements and disputes, the parties were ultimately able to reach
 6 the current settlement.

7 The detailed terms of the settlement are set forth in the Joint Stipulation of
 8 Class Action Settlement and Release ("Settlement Agreement") entered into by the
 9 parties and previously provided to this Court as part of the Motion for Preliminary
 10 Approval. (Docket Nos. 57 & 58). Pursuant to the settlement terms, Defendant
 11 will pay the entirety (100%) of the settlement sum of \$3.25 million without any
 12 reversion to Defendant.

13 The proposed settlement meets the criteria for final approval which are set
 14 forth in the Manual for Complex Litigation, 4th Ed., is well within the range of
 15 what would be fair, reasonable, and adequate in this case. Thus, Plaintiff requests
 16 that the Court take the final step in the approval process – granting the requested
 17 final approval of the settlement which is sought herein.

18 **III. THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS HAS BEEN DUTIFULLY ADHERED** 19 **TO AND SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT**

20 **A. Dissemination of Notice**

21 As noted above, preliminary approval was granted on August 5, 2015. At
 22 that time, The Garden City Group ("Settlement Administrator") was appointed by
 23 the Court as the Settlement Administrator. The parties, through the work of the
 24 Settlement Administrator, have complied with this Court's orders concerning
 25 dissemination of the class notice. (Declaration of Jennifer M. Keough ("Keough
 26 Decl.") ¶¶ 4-13). In addition, the Settlement Administrator established and
 27 operated a toll free telephone number for class members to call with inquiries
 28 concerning the settlement and the claims process. (*Id.* at ¶ 9).

1 The Notice was mailed to the class of 3,770 individuals utilizing the data
 2 provided by Defendants. (Keough Decl. ¶¶ 4-7). Of those, 63 were returned as
 3 having invalid addresses. 54 of those were re-mailed with an updated address.
 4 (Keough Decl. ¶ 8).

5 **B. No Objections Have Been Filed To Date and Only Four (4)**
 6 **Exclusions Have Been Requested**

7 The objection deadline will pass on October 19, 2015. As mentioned above,
 8 to date, not a single individual has filed any objections to this settlement, and only
 9 four (4) individuals (representing .1% of the class) have requested to opt-out of the
 10 current settlement, further evidencing the favorable view of the settlement from
 11 class members. (Keough Decl. ¶¶ 11-12). Prior to the hearing on this Motion,
 12 Plaintiff will file a supplemental brief addressing whether any new
 13 objections/exclusions have been filed.

14 **IV. OVERVIEW OF ISSUES AND ARGUMENT**

15 As discussed in detail in the previously filed Motion for Preliminary
 16 Approval (Doc. No. 58), and briefly mentioned above, the class claim at issue in
 17 this lawsuit arises out of Defendants' issuance of itemized wage statements (i.e.,
 18 pay stubs), which every employer is required to do in California pursuant to Labor
 19 Code § 226(a). Plaintiff alleges that as a matter of corporate policy, practice and
 20 procedure, each and every wage statement issued by Defendants to the class
 21 members did not accurately identify the pay period start date, the total hours
 22 worked, and the name of the legal entity that is the employer. As a result of such
 23 conduct, Plaintiff asserts that the wage statements violated Labor Code § 226(a). As
 24 a result of such violations, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants were liable for penalties
 25 pursuant to Labor Code § 226(e) and Labor Code § 2699 *et seq.*

26 Defendants, however, strongly disagree with Plaintiff's contentions and
 27 believe that Plaintiff's claims are without merit. In particular, Defendants contend
 28 that the claims are not subject to class certification. Further, Defendants argued that

the alleged violations did not amount to the “knowing and intentional” or “injury” standards that are required to be established under Labor Code § 226(e), and that any penalties awarded would be unjust and capricious in nature. Further, to the extent that any appeals would have to be taken, Plaintiff and the Class would not have received any compensation from this case until such appeals were exhausted and assuming that the appeal was decided in Plaintiff’s favor. Therefore, Plaintiff and the Class would have faced substantial risk in proceeding with the litigation had a settlement not been reached.

The settlement reached by the parties creates a substantial common fund for the settlement class, while taking into consideration the differing positions on the law and the facts.

V. LITIGATION HISTORY

On November 27, 2013, Benjamin Castro¹ filed this class action lawsuit in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Declaration of Larry W. Lee (“Lee Decl.”) ¶ 4. On January 8, 2014, Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Lee Decl. ¶ 5. On February 10, 2014, the First Amended Complaint pursuant to the Parties stipulation and this Court’s Order. Lee Decl. ¶ 6. In essence, the complaints alleged that Defendants failed to issue accurate itemized wage statements in compliance with California Labor Code § 226(a). Lee Decl. ¶ 7.

Thereafter, the Parties engaged in significant discovery. Specifically Plaintiff issued various written discover requests including interrogatories and document requests. Lee Decl. ¶ 8. In response, Defendants produced responses and nearly 4,000 pages of documents. Lee Decl. ¶ 9. Because of various disputes, motions to compel were also filed against Defendants, which were ultimately resolved by Magistrate Judge Rosenberg. Lee Decl. ¶ 10.

¹ As further explained below, Plaintiff Zyra Garcia recently replaced Benjamin Castro as the Named Class Representative.

1 Subsequently thereafter, the depositions of Defendants' FRCP 30(b)(6)
2 witnesses were taken, which involved four (4) different individuals and which took
3 place in Houston, TX and Chicago, IL. Lee Decl. ¶ 11. Similarly, Defendants also
4 took the deposition of Benjamin Castro. Lee Decl. ¶ 12. Based upon the discovery
5 conducted, the Parties agreed to further amend the complaint. Lee Decl. ¶ 13. As
6 such, pursuant to this Court's Order, the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") was
7 filed on May 16, 2014. Lee Decl. ¶ 14.

8 While the SAC continued to assert the same causes of action, and continued
9 to assert the wage statements failure to identify the pay period start date and total
10 hours worked, the allegation regarding the employee ID number was withdrawn.
11 Lee Decl. ¶ 15. However, the SAC also alleged that the wage statements failed to
12 identify the accurate name of the legal entity that is the employer. Lee Decl. ¶ 16.

13 On September 5, 2014, the Motion for Class Certification was filed. Lee
14 Decl. ¶ 17. While said motion was pending, the Parties agreed to mediate this case,
15 and did so with mediator Mark Rudy on October 1, 2014. Lee Decl. ¶ 18. Mr.
16 Rudy is a well experienced and respected mediator in the area of wage and hour
17 class actions. Lee Decl. ¶ 19. Based upon said mediation, and a mediator's
18 proposal from Mr. Rudy, the Parties reached a class-wide settlement of this case.
19 Lee Decl. ¶ 20.

20 Subsequent thereto, it was discovered that Benjamin Castro may have a
21 conflict of interest with the class members with respect to the class-wide settlement.
22 Lee Decl. ¶ 21. As a result thereof, the Parties agreed to replace Mr. Castro with
23 Plaintiff Zyra Garcia as the named representative, which this Court approved on
24 May 11, 2015. Lee Decl. ¶ 22. As such, the Third Amended Complaint was filed
25 on May 11, 2015, which identifies Plaintiff Zyra Garcia as the named
26 representative, and which is the operative complaint in this action. Lee Decl. ¶ 23.
27 The TAC alleges the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Labor Code §226;
28 and (2) Penalties Under Labor Code § 2698 *et. seq.* (Private Attorney General Act).

1 Needless to say, from the time of removal to the instant settlement, the class claims
2 in this case has been actively and vigorously litigated by both Parties.

3 On August 5, 2015, this Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
4 Approval. (Doc. No. 60). As the Court stated in its Order:

5
6 The Court finds on a preliminary basis that the proposed settlement described
7 in the Agreement (including the monetary provisions, the plan of allocation
8 the release of claims, the proposed award of attorneys' fees and costs and the
9 Class Representative Service Payment) falls within the "range of
10 reasonableness" and therefore grants preliminary approval of the Agreement.
11 Based on a review of the papers submitted by the Parties, the Court finds that
12 the Agreement is the result of extensive arms-length negotiations conducted
13 after Class Counsel had adequately investigated the claims and became
14 familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of those claims. The assistance of
15 an experienced mediator in the settlement process supports the Court's
16 conclusion that the Agreement is non-collusive.

17 (Doc. No. 60 at p. 3) Based on the Court's Order granting preliminary approval, it
18 set the hearing on this Motion for Final Approval. (*Id.*)

19 VI. THE SETTLEMENT

20 The Settlement terms were summarized in detail in the Motion for
21 Preliminary Approval, and Plaintiff respectfully incorporates those arguments
22 herein so as to avoid unnecessary duplication. The specific terms of the settlement
23 are set forth in the Settlement Agreement filed on July 2, 2015. (Doc. No. 57). The
24 principal terms are:

25 a. Defendants will pay a total Settlement Amount of \$3,250,000.00. This
26 sum includes payments made to the settlement class members, the LWDA payment,
27 settlement administration costs, awards of attorneys' fees and costs, and incentive
28 awards to the named plaintiff.

b. The sum available for use for payments to class members after the
LWDA payment, settlement administration costs, awards of attorneys' fees and
costs, and incentive award to the named plaintiff is designated in the Settlement

1 Agreement as the Net Settlement Amount. Defendants agree that it shall pay the
 2 entirety (100%) of the Net Settlement Amount. **In other words, the settlement is**
 3 **non-reversionary, meaning that no funds will revert back to Defendants.**

4 c. No claim forms were necessary for any class member to participate in
 5 the settlement and receive their share of the settlement. Thus, any class member
 6 who does not opt-out in connection with this settlement notice will automatically
 7 receive his/her share of the settlement proceeds. On average, each class member
 8 will receive approximately a payment of \$566.01. (Keough Decl. ¶ 14).

9 d. All of this Court's orders in connection with the settlement
 10 administration process have been followed. (*See* Declaration of Jennifer M.
 11 Keough filed herewith).

12 The settlement represents a compromise between the positions and
 13 evaluations of the two sides to this controversy. Clearly, there were significant
 14 disagreements between the Parties as to the facts and the law.

15 **VII. THE SETTLEMENT EXCEEDS THE STANDARDS FOR FINAL** 16 **APPROVAL**

17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that any compromise of a
 18 class action must receive Court approval. The court has broad discretion to grant
 19 such approval and should do so where the proposed settlement is "fair, adequate,
 20 reasonable, and not a product of collusion." *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d
 21 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998); *Joel A. v. Giuliani*, 218 F.3d 132, 138 (2nd Cir. 2000).
 22 In determining whether a proposed settlement should be approved, the Ninth
 23 Circuit has a "strong judicial policy that favors settlement, particularly where
 24 complex class action litigation is concerned." *Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle*, 955 F.2d
 25 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992).

26 The fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of any class action settlement
 27 depends on "the relative strength of the plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense,
 28 complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class

1 action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of
2 discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of
3 counsel; ... and the reaction of class members to the proposed settlement.” *Hanlon*
4 150 F.3d at 1026. Here, as set forth in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and
5 discussed below, the factors for final approval of this settlement have been
6 established.

7 **A. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case Supports Settlement**

8 This factor is generally satisfied when plaintiffs must overcome barriers to
9 make their case. *Chun–Hoon v. McKee Foods Corp.*, 716 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851
10 (N.D. Cal. 2010). As noted above, while Plaintiff had filed the Motion for Class
11 Certification, and while Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel strongly believe that said
12 Motion would have been granted, there was no guarantee. Further, even if a class
13 were to be certified, Plaintiff would still be required to show that the alleged
14 violation is indeed a violation of Labor Code § 226(a), and that such violation was
15 knowing and intentional, and caused injury to the class members. Thus, if any of
16 these issues were found against Plaintiff, Plaintiff and the Class would have been
17 without any remedy. Further, to the extent that any appeals would have to be taken,
18 Plaintiff and the Class would not have received any compensation from this case
19 until such appeals were exhausted and assuming that the appeal was decided in
20 Plaintiff’s favor. Therefore, Plaintiff and the Class would have faced substantial
21 risk in proceeding with the litigation had a settlement not been reached.

22 Therefore, this factor favors settlement. See *Dyer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*,
23 2014 WL 5369395, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2014) (factor favors final approval
24 where “[p]laintiffs acknowledge that, if the settlement is not approved, they will
25 encounter significant obstacles in establishing their claims”); see also *Moore v.*
26 *Verizon Commc’ns Inc.*, 2013 WL 4610764, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2013)
27 (finding that the relative strength of plaintiffs’ case favored settlement because
28 plaintiffs admitted they would face hurdles in proving liability and damages).

B. Risks, Expense, and Duration of Continued Litigation Supports Settlement

“Difficulties and risks in litigating weigh in favor of approving a class settlement.” *Dyer*, 2014 WL 5369395, at *3 (citation omitted). Briefing on class certification, liability and damages, including with respect to any anticipated Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as preparation for trial would have been time-consuming and expensive. Moreover, Plaintiff acknowledges that there was some risk that she would recover nothing for herself and the Class after further protracted litigation. Thus, the risks, expense, and duration of continued litigation favor final approval of the settlement. *See Dyer*, 2014 WL 5369395, at *3 (“This factor supports final approval of this settlement because, without a settlement, Plaintiffs would risk recovering nothing after a lengthy and costly litigation.”).

C. The Settlement Amount Favors Settlement

“It is well-settled law that a cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery does not per se render the settlement inadequate or unfair.” *In re Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (approving settlement six percent of projected damages). Thus, settlements of 25 to 35 percent of the total potential recovery in wage and hour cases are routinely considered fair and reasonable. *See Dyer*, 2014 WL 5369395, at *3 (settlement reasonable where it “represents approximately one-third of what class members could have obtained had they succeeded at trial”); *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.*, No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 W L 221862, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) (finding settlement worth 25 to 35 percent of best-case recovery reasonable), *aff’d*, 331 Fed. Appx. 452 (9th Cir. 2009).

Here, the settlement provides that Defendant will pay \$3.25 million, with the entirety of this sum to be paid out. As already mentioned in the preliminary approval motion, an “apples to apples” comparison can be made between this

1 settlement, which is in the gross settlement amount of \$3,250,000 for 3,770
2 individuals, and the settlement in *McKenzie v. Federal Express Corp.*, 2012 US
3 Dist Lexis 103666 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2012), which involved a gross settlement
4 amount of \$8,250,000 for 14,348 individuals. Not only did the *McKenzie* case
5 involve the same exaction violations as alleged in the current case, the District
6 Court found that the *McKenzie* settlement to be fair, reasonable and adequate. *Id.* at
7 *6. Given that the settlement dollar per class member is significant higher in the
8 current case than in the *McKenzie* case, it should lead to the logical conclusion that
9 the current settlement is indeed fair, reasonable and adequate. Thus, this settlement
10 amount falls well within the percentage approved in other employment-related class
11 actions, particularly when the uncertainties of continued litigation are taken into
12 account. *Dyer*, 2014 WL 5369395, at *3; *Glass*, 2007 WL 221862, at *4.

13 Moreover, courts have acknowledged that, even if the court has concerns
14 about the class recovery, the lack of objection to the recovery by the class weighs in
15 favor of finding that the settlement amount is fair and reasonable. *See Chun-Hoon*,
16 716 F. Supp. 2d at 851. In *Chun-Hoon*, although the court had concerns about the
17 adequacy of the settlement during preliminary certification, the lack of objection to
18 the settlement aided the court in determining that the settlement was beneficial to
19 the class. *Id.* Here, not a single objection was filed. As such, this settlement
20 should be viewed favorably.

21 **D. The Extent of Discovery Favors Settlement**

22 Here, settlement was reached following the exchange of significant written
23 discovery, the deposition of Defendants' Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses on four separate
24 occasions and Plaintiff, production and review of substantial amounts of data and
25 documents, and a full-day mediation between counsel facilitated by an experienced
26 class action mediator. (Lee Decl. ¶¶ 8-20). The negotiations at all times were
27 adversarial and non-collusive. (Lee Decl. ¶ 18-20). Moreover, plaintiff's counsel
28 had the discovery necessary to ascertain the value of the class claims. (Lee Decl. ¶

18). Courts have held that such discovery is sufficient for parties to make an informed decision regarding the adequacy of the settlement. *See, e.g., Dyer*, 2014 WL 5369395, at *3 (parties’ participation in written discovery, depositions, witness interviews, and formal mediation favors an informed settlement); *Chun-Hoon*, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (“true value of the class claims is well-known and class counsel possess a sufficient understanding of the issues involved and the strengths and weaknesses of the case”); *see also In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (formal discovery not necessary where the parties have sufficient information to make an informed decision about settlement).

E. The Recommendations of Counsel Favor Approval of the Settlement

The recommendations of experienced counsel should be given considerable weight. *Boyd v. Bechtel Corp.*, 485 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1979); *Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility*, 87 F.R.D. 15, 18 (N.D. Cal. 1980), (“[T]he fact that experienced counsel involved in the case approved the settlement after hard-fought negotiations is entitled to considerable weight.”); *Kirkorian v. Borelli*, 695 F. Supp. 446, 451 (N.D. Cal. 1988); *Reed v. General Motors Corp.*, 703 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1983); *Williams v. Vukovich*, 720 F.2d 909, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1983); *Armstrong v. Board of Sch. Dirs.*, 616 F.2d 305, 325 (7th Cir. 1980).

Lead counsel for Plaintiff has broad experience litigating employment and, specifically, wage-and-hour class actions. (Lee Decl. ¶¶ 26-29; Choi Decl. ¶¶ 13-15). They support this settlement as a fair and reasonable settlement which is in the best interest of the settlement class. (Lee Decl. ¶ 24; Choi Decl. ¶¶ 3-4). Therefore, this factor favors approval of the settlement. *See Dyer*, 2014 WL 5369395, at *3 (recommendation of plaintiffs’ counsel supports approval of settlement); *Chun-Hoon*, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (same).

F. The Class Has Responded Favorably to the Proposed Settlement

“[T]he absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class action

1 settlement raises a strong presumption that” the settlement is favorable to class
 2 members. *In re Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Cal.
 3 2008), *see Pallas v. Pacific Bell*, 1999 WL 1209495, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 13,
 4 1999) (“The greater the number of objectors, the heavier the burden on the
 5 proponents of settlement to prove fairness.”).

6 Here, not a single objection was filed. Further, only four (4) individuals,
 7 representing .1% of the class, have opted out of this settlement. (Keough Decl. at
 8 ¶¶ 11-12). Thus, the lack of any objections and miniscule opt-outs strongly support
 9 the fairness of the settlement. *See Churchill Vill. LLC v. Gen. Elec.*, 361 F.3d 566,
 10 577 (9th Cir. 2004) (approving settlement with 45 objections and 500 opt-outs from
 11 a 90,000-person class, representing .05% and .56% of the class, respectively); *Dyer*,
 12 2014 WL 5369395, at *4 (strong support from class in favor of approving
 13 settlement where only three of 8,695 class members opted out); *Chun-Hoon*, 716 F.
 14 Supp. 2d at 852 (where 16 of 329 class members opted out, court found that
 15 positive class reaction “strongly supports settlement”).

16 **G. The Procedure Through Which the Settlement Was Achieved** 17 **Supports Final Approval**

18 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the factors to be examined at final
 19 approval may differ depending on the circumstance of each case. *Officers for*
 20 *Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625. Therefore, although not one of the Officers for Justice
 21 listed factors, the procedures by which the settlement was achieved also strongly
 22 support the fairness of the settlement. *See Chun-Hoon*, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 851 (“To
 23 these factors, the court adds as a ninth factor to consider the procedure by which the
 24 settlement was arrived at”), citing *Manual for Complex Litigation* (Fourth) § 21.6
 25 (2004). As noted above, the parties participated in an arm’s-length negotiation,
 26 facilitated by a professional mediator with significant class action experience. This
 27 weighs in favor of approval of the settlement. *See Chun-Hoon*, 716 F. Supp. 2d at
 28 851 (finding that use of formal arm’s-length mediation supported approval of

1 settlement agreement).

2 Further, the Ninth Circuit has shown longstanding support of settlements
3 reached through arms' length negotiation by capable opponents. In *Rodriguez v.*
4 *West Publishing Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth circuit expressly
5 opined that courts should defer to the "private consensual decision of the [settling]
6 parties." *Id.* at 965, citing *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1027. The primary reason for
7 deferring to such settlements is the experience of counsel and the participation of a
8 neutral, both of which factors are present here.

9 The *Rodriguez* Court "put a good deal of stock in the product of an arms'
10 length, non-collusive, negotiated resolution, and have never prescribed a particular
11 formula by which that outcome must be tested." *Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 965
12 (citations omitted). As the Court explained, "[i]n reality, parties, counsel,
13 mediators, and district judges naturally arrive at a reasonable range for settlements
14 by considering the likelihood of a plaintiffs' or defense verdict, the potential
15 recovery, and the chances of obtaining it, discounted to present value." *Id.* at 965
16 (citations omitted). *See also Williams v. Vukovich*, 720 F.2d 909, 922-923 (6th
17 Cir.1983) ("The court should defer to the judgment of experienced counsel who has
18 competently evaluated the strength of his proofs"); 2 *Newberg on Class Actions* §
19 11.24 (4th Ed. & Supp. 2002); *Manual For Complex Litigation* (Fourth) § 30.42).

20 The proposed settlement has no deficiencies. There is no standard or
21 benchmark for determining whether any given settlement is fair. "Ultimately the
22 district court's determination is nothing more than 'an amalgam of delicate
23 balancing, gross approximations and rough justice.'" *Officers for Justice v. Civil*
24 *Service Comm'n of City and County of San Francisco*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th. Cir.
25 1982) (citation omitted). In making its determination, the Court should weigh the
26 benefits that the settlement will realize for the class against the uncertainty of
27 litigation and the possibility that the class members would obtain no relief in the
28 absence of a settlement. *See Linney v. Cellular Alaska P'ship*, 151 F.3d 1234, 1242

(9th Cir. 1998) (“it is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements”).

The settlement has been reached after considerable investigation, litigation, negotiation, and involving the mediation efforts of a highly experienced mediator. Each side evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of their case and independently came to the conclusion that this settlement represents a responsible means of addressing the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, as well as Defendants’ contention that it would prevail on the merits.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The parties have reached this settlement following extensive litigation, ongoing case discussions and arms-length negotiations. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court:

1. Grant final approval of the proposed settlement;
2. Order payment from the settlement proceeds to the Settlement Administrator in compliance with the Settlement Agreement;
3. Grant the contemporaneously pending Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Representative Enhancement Award;
4. Enter the proposed Final Approval Order and Final Judgment submitted herewith; and
5. Retain continuing jurisdiction over the implementation, interpretation, administration and consummation of the settlement.

DATED: October 19, 2015

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